San Francisco, CA, USA - AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS IS IMPORTANT AND HAS BEEN NEGLECTED:

VOTE FOR SENATOR JOHN KERRY FOR PRESIDENT

This year's Presidential election result will pivot on foreign policy issues. In Iraq, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and other troubled regions, America's global diplomatic role is at question, with the candidates and electorate scrambling for cogent theories and answers. In that regard, President Bush would do well to direct our attention to Northern Ireland.

A decade ago, the idea of looking toward Northern Ireland for a model of terrorism management and conflict resolution would have been laughably absurd. Year after year, decade after decade, this small province offered nothing to hopeful eyes other than bloodshed, political intransigence, and the facile, faulty assumption that this battle between two "warring tribes" of Protestants and Catholicsãfomented by the Irish Republican Armyãwas merely an internal security matter best handled solely by the British government.

President Clinton changed that dynamic. Due to developments in Northern Ireland, a personal interest in the area, and a desire to woo Irish Catholic "Reagan Democrat" swing voters, he eschewed years of our country's "hands off" approach to bring us to the negotiating table. To do so, he employed five key tactics leading to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement ("GFA") peace accord, all supported by Senator John Kerry:

• Presidential Commitment: President Clinton focused on the issue with unrelenting attention. He demonstrated curiosity, concern, and a willingness to commit his Administration to the time, money, and manpower necessary to strive for peace. He traveled to Northern Ireland and walked the streets of Belfast to hear its citizens' voices. In the final hours leading up to the GFA, he was available 24/7 to assist all parties;
• Special Envoy Appointment: The President appointed Senator George Mitchell as his point person to travel to Northern Ireland, engage all parties on a daily basis, lead negotiations, and set deadlines. Sen. Mitchell was chosen for his diligence, his history of impeccable public statecraft, and his ability to be perceived as a neutral sounding board and advocate for peace. His position was permanent, and he was in regular contact with the President regarding progress;
• Multilateralism: The Administration worked effectively with the British and Irish governments, Northern Ireland's political parties, and Canadian, South African, Finnish, and other international representatives who brought diplomatic and conflict negotiation expertise to the fore. It treated all key players with respect, exhibiting a teamwork-oriented approach, rather than hubris or force;
• Twin-Track Diplomacy: Instead of waiting to begin negotiations on the perfect sunny day when all violence ended, Sen. Mitchell bifurcated the peace process into separate, concurrent tracks of teams dealing with demilitarization and political issues;
• Taking Risks: The Clinton Administration issued a visa to Sinn Fein representative and alleged IRA leader Gerry Adams, put its reputation on the line at the peace table, and granted political amnesty to many U.S.-based Irish nationals fighting deportation. All these moves were highly controversial at the time; all could have easily been shelved due to domestic political considerations or to fear of alienating our country's long-standing relationship with the British government. Yet all led toward peace.

President Bush, regrettably, has squandered this fine political legacy. He has failed to become personally involved with the Northern Ireland issue, but simultaneously ramped up deportation proceedings against Irish nationals and proffered a new United States-United Kingdom extradition treaty that troubles many civil liberties observers. He has maintained that it is in our "national interest" that there is "lasting peace" in Northern Ireland, and has cited it as a global model for conflict resolution. Yet, the province's local government has been shut down for two years due to stalled talks and political acrimony, and the President's lack of personal attention to this and other issues sends a different message to Northern Ireland and the world.

President Bush has used the same inattentive approach elsewhere. Our country's recent attempts to implement peace in the Middle East, specifically between Israelis and Palestinians, exhibit little of the above-mentioned tactics. As for working with allies, as we did in Northern Ireland, President Bush has repeatedly opted for unilateralism rather than cooperation. This aggressive approach has brought predictable results: recent University of Maryland and Irish newspaper surveys indicate that Ireland and almost all other European countries would vote overwhelmingly for Sen. Kerry over President Bush. Indeed, when the President visited Ireland this year, he received an unfavorable welcome among its citizenry and in some political circles. When even ultra-friendly Ireland cannot be counted on for a warm embrace, our President and our country have an alarming problem. Numerous credible reports seem to establish that America's relationship with Ireland has, at least temporarily, been put in decline. This ought to be unacceptable.

Ireland and Europe have it right: Senator John Kerry should be elected this fall, not President Bush. The President's track record at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere no longer allows him to be perceived as a committed, honest peace broker in Northern Ireland, and brings up similar limitations in his ability to deal with the Middle East and other contentious parts of the world. The time is ripe for Sen. Kerry's more balanced, thoughtful approach.

NORTHERN IRELAND ALERT SCORECARD:

UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

SUMMARY REPORT

(The following is a summary of our complete 40-page Scorecard on the United States Presidential Candidates, which begins on page 17, and will be available soon on the Internet, at: Massachusetts Ancient Order of Hibernians branch's web site and at the Connecticut Ancient Order of Hibernians branch's web site).

Approximately 30-34 million Americans listed "Irish" or "Celtic" as an ancestral identity in the 2000 census. The Irish remain the second-largest ethnic group in the U.S., comprising 11% of the population in 2000. Many of these Irish-Americans reside in the political territory known as "Reagan Democrats," a group of Irish, Italian, and Polish Americans whose support was credited with helping elect President Reagan in 1980. On occasion, however, they have swung back to reunite with the Democratic Party, as they did twice during the Clinton years. While most observers expect Senator John Kerry to win important states with major Irish population centers -- California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York -- Republicans and Democrats are focusing their outreach efforts on up to 17 key battleground states which are expected to determine this year's Presidential election outcome. The Irish rank as one of the top three ethnic groups in each of these 17 states. No Presidential candidate has won the White House without winning the Catholic vote in recent times. Some of these Irish voters wish to see interest and activity regarding the Northern Ireland peace process and other Ireland-related issues. We publish this Scorecard in the hope that an informed American electorate will make appropriate choices this November to ensure that the Presidential race will be won by a candidate who will personally focus and act upon the ongoing peace, human rights, economic, and education conditions in Northern Ireland.

SENATOR JOHN KERRY
SENATOR JOHN EDWARDS

For years, everyone assumed that Senator John Kerry, because of his name and residence in Massachusetts, was Irish. It wasn't until January 2003 that he learned in a meeting with Boston Globe reporters who had done genealogical research that his Austrian background was Jewish.

Sen. Kerry made an auspicious debut in his earliest days in the U.S. Senate. In February 1985, he co-sponsored a Senate concurrent resolution calling on President Reagan to appoint a special envoy for Northern Ireland. Although this resolution died on the Congressional vine, his support for the initiative put him almost a decade ahead of the curve on this proposal compared to most of his colleagues.

Soon thereafter, Sen. Kerry entered a Congressional debate involving ratification of the anti-terrorism Supplementary Extradition Treaty between the U.S. and the United Kingdom. Over the course of three Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, significant opposition to the treaty grew among several members, primarily from Sens. Kerry, Christopher Dodd, and Joseph Biden. Their objections centered on concerns regarding elimination of safeguards protecting those whose crimes were deemed "political" acts under the existing treaty.

The treaty languished in committee until a U.S. raid on Libya in 1986, carried out, in part, by American planes flying out of U.S. bases in Great Britain. Standing alone among American allies in sharing its airspace, the British government, with assistance from the Reagan Administration, urged prompt Senate ratification of the treaty as a sign of good faith that the U.S. would support Great Britain in its fight against terrorism as Great Britain had helped the U.S. The Committee convened again, and compromises were sought to ensure swift passage.

Sen. Kerry and others, however, continued to lead the opposition. He repeatedly expressed concerns over the Northern Ireland criminal justice system, at one point remarking that it "had more in common with the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos than it does with the justice systems of either the United States or Great Britain itself." He also criticized the Northern Ireland judicial system's bail procedure, denial of access to lawyers, use of coerced confessions and interrogation centers, creation of non-jury courts, method of enlisting paid informant "supergrass" trials to obtain convictions, and reliance upon a "shoot-to-kill" policy against suspected terrorists. And, in words that ring particularly true today, Sen. Kerry commented, "[i]f the world community of nations is going to be able to deal effectively with terrorism, it has to condemn it no matter where it occurs or who is the perpetrator of such terrorist acts -- be they governments or individuals, be they allies or enemies."

Eventually, Committee Chairman Sen. Richard Lugar reached a compromise with Sen. Kerry and the other opponents, inserting a section detailing violent crimes for which the political offense exception could not be asserted, while adding language permitting federal judges to deny extradition if a fugitive presented sufficient evidence that he was sought "with a view to punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions."

As one cogent analysis of this Senate battle concluded, however, the clamor over the treaty "was about the preservation of the political offense exception as it has been applied and interpreted since the nineteenth century. And with the Foreign Relations Committee's [compromise and] vote [of approval] ... , that struggle was over. ... The political offense exception [as previously codified] was dead." Sen. Kerry and others fought valiantly to maintain the principles of the political offense exception, but, at the end of the day, the Senate, including Sen. Kerry, ratified a significantly watered-down version of the 1972 treaty.

In his most significant action on Irish issues to date, Sen. Kerry joined Sens. Kennedy, Dodd, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan in a letter to President Clinton, requesting that he grant a temporary visa to allow Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams to visit the U.S. Adams was eventually granted the visa in a high-risk move by the Clinton Administration that proved to be one of the seminal moments in the peace process, opening communication channels on both sides of the Atlantic in an act of good faith that helped lead to an IRA cease-fire later in the year. The request was also a high-risk move by the Senators, all of whom had followed Irish affairs, yet, in their repeated condemnations of violence on all sides in the conflict, had eschewed any public support of Sinn Fein.

On the Presidential campaign trail, Sen. Kerry has issued a number of Northern Ireland-related statements. In February 2004, he pledged to follow the path set by Sen. Kenn edy, President Clinton, and Sen. George Mitchell in "put[ting] the Northern Ireland peace process high on America's foreign policy agenda." He criticized President Bush for "fail[ing] to recognize the importance of building on the work of President Clinton in facilitating the peace process." In this regard, he specifically faulted the President for not becoming personally involved in the peace process, and for a "lack of urgency" in taking several months to find a replacement for U.S. Ambassador to Ireland Richard Egan after his December 2003 resignation. He welcomed the reduction of violence and the implementation of new policing structures. He urged the IRA and loyalist paramilitaries to discard their weapons and to end all terrorist activity, and called for the restoration of the Northern Ireland assembly -- without a renegotiation of the Good Friday Agreement ("GFA"). In more provocative comments, he singled out the Democratic Unionist Party for "disenfranchising half the population of Northern Ireland by refusing to form a government with Sinn Fein." He cited economic ties between the U.S. and Northern Ireland and Ireland, and pledged to work with the Dublin government to repair ties with Europe "which were greatly damaged in President Bush's handling of the situation in Iraq." Kerry's pledge to play a "constructive role" in these developments was praised as "possibly the most comprehensive and thorough of any ever released by a candidate running for President."

A month later, Sen. Kerry joined Sen. Kennedy and three other Senators in a letter to U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, outlining their growing concern over the British government's handling of Canadian Judge Peter Corey's reports on alleged state collusion in the controversial murders of Pat Finucane, Rosemary Nelson, Billy Wright, and Robert Hamill.

In late June, as President Bush headed to Ireland for a U.S.-European Union summit meeting, Sen. Kerry called on the President to exert "Presidential leadership" on Northern Ireland during his visit. Kerry noted the "significant" peace process setbacks of the last four years and the suspension of the Assembly, claiming that the U.S. has a "strong interest" in promoting peace and that as President he would play whatever "constructive and proactive role may be of use in advancing the peace process."

These actions and others lead to the topical question: What would be the tone and activity level of a possible Kerry Presidency? Based on his track record, it seems safe to predict that he would be active on the issue. While Sen. Kerry's attention to Irish concerns may not match the activity of Sen. Kennedy in Massachusetts and some politicians along the East Coast, a wider lens reveals that he has paid consistent attention to Northern Ireland and has taken action -- sometimes crucial action, as with supporting the Adams visa. His Northern Ireland resume is certainly as credible as any first-time candidate for the Presidency since Sen. Kennedy's run in 1980.

Many of Sen. Kerry's actions have a "me too" quality to them, as they were undertaken along with or behind Sen. Kennedy. Even Sen. Kerry's campaign manager is a Kennedy link: former Chief of Staff Mary Beth Cahill. A Kerry Presidency would likely toe the "Kennedy line": intolerant of terrorism, critical of peace process delays, aware of the human rights and political situations, and willing to become personally involved when and where appropriate. It also seems reasonable to assume, as some uncorroborated sources have indicated, that Sen. Kerry would visit Ireland sometime during his Presidency, as his running mate, Sen. John Edwards, has already pledged. Probably the only risk inherent in a potential Kerry Administration foreign policy toward Northern Ireland would be that he would take too "green" a view of the situation, alienating Unionist representatives in his efforts to fast-forward the peace process and to curry favor with Nationalists and Irish-Americans

In sum, we find that Sen. Kerry has been an active follower and participant in Irish affairs. His actions to date hold great promise that a Kerry Administration would equal President Bush's record on the Irish issue, with the good possibility that he would surpass it in the areas of
(1) personal involvement and
(2) restoring our relationship with Europe and Ireland to an extent where our President's direct input into the peace process would be on surer footing.
As for Sen. Edwards, we have rated him INTERESTED in the past and find nothing in his record to indicate that he would significantly lead or obstruct on this issue.

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH
VICE PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY

Once elected, President George W. Bush inherited from President Clinton a Northern Ireland policy that was and is difficult to match. Bereft of his predecessor's personal interest in the matter or key National Security Council members who helped frame it, and armed with little more than a rudimentary knowledge of the intricacies of the situation, President Bush was doubted by many concerned observers who wondered aloud what, if anything, he would originate to maintain the policy. And if it was to be maintained, would the impetus come from the White House or be delegated to the State Department, where it had resided prior to the Clinton Presidency?

By mid-March 2001, given a mixed bag of White House actions and lukewarm statements on the issue, many commentators were still openly questioning what, if any, role President Bush was going to assume on Northern Ireland. During the annual St. Patrick's Day festivities at the White House and in Washington, though, the Administration's efforts began to hit stride. During a very upbeat address to Irish-American leaders in the East Room, Bush stated, "The United States stands ready to help. It is in our national interest that there be a lasting peace, a real lasting peace, in Northern Ireland." Also, around this time, two key Ireland-related Administration nominations emerged and were later confirmed: Richard Egan for Ambassador to Ireland, and Richard Haass for "special point person" at the State Department on Northern Ireland-related matters.

Although Egan's role in Northern Ireland became important from time to time, it was Richard Haass's activity that predominated. Haass met repeatedly in Washington with all influential members of Northern Ireland's political parties, policing representatives, and British and Irish political leaders. Some of these meetings were with assorted combinations of President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, or National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, yet many more were on his own. More importantly, Haass made approximately a dozen visits overseas, where he met Northern Ireland, British, and Irish officials, whether in the U.K., Ireland, or Northern Ireland. Through these trips abroad and meetings in the U.S., Haass remained consistently involved and was generally regarded as being just a phone call away from a broad range of political contacts.

In general, Haass's public comments on Northern Ireland were perceptive, sensitive, respectful of the British and Irish governments' positions on the issue, and solidly within the framework espoused by the GFA. Haass also deserves kudos for his personal interest in sponsoring integrated education in Northern Ireland, as well as staying with the role several months after he announced in June 2003 that he would leave the job to work for the Council on Foreign Relations. During his final days, he received accolades from almost all key players for his knowledge, interest, and fairness to all parties. As one peace talks participant said, "Haass [was] trusted by all sides. He [was] a pragmatist and a fixer."

Haass's successor, Mitchell Reiss, was named as envoy in December 2003. From his early days to the present, Reiss has met with a cross-section of Northern Ireland, British, and Irish leaders, both in Washington and on several trips to Ireland and the U.K., including the recent peace talks at Leeds Castle in Kent. Reiss, like Haass, receives high marks for his evenhandedness to all parties. Perhaps Reiss's most constructive comments to date have occurred during his April visit to Belfast. While there, he offered three credible possibilities to help Northern Ireland society move more quickly and fully toward truth and reconciliation. The first would be "some aspect of storytelling" whereby victims would be able to have their story memorialized. The second would consist of some type of information release of documents -- along the lines of a Freedom of Information Act release -- that would assist people in finding out more information on the circumstances of death or injury to their loved ones. Lastly, Reiss indicated that some form of compensation element might be appropriate and helpful. Regardless of which element or elements were put in place, Reiss insisted that it was immediately important to open up a dialogue with victims to learn what they would like to see in the reconciliation process.

Unfortunately, Ambassador Egan's days in Ireland proved numbered. A mere 15 months after passing the nomination process, he resigned in December 2002. Egan later remarked that he found his second year in Ireland to be "very, very boring," and that considering his experience there, "anybody with aspirations for the job should think twice." Egan's departure did not speak well for the Bush Administration's attention to Irish affairs, nor did a lengthy process to find a replacement. Finally, after almost a year's delay, James Kenny, a Chicago-based construction company executive and Republican fundraiser, was confirmed and assumed the post in October 2003.

As previously mentioned, some of Haass's and Reiss's activities and meetings have been in conjunction with involvement by Secretary of State Powell. As their "boss," Powell has met occasionally in Washington with members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and British and Irish governments, and, from time to time, has issued statements reacting to events in Northern Ireland or to peace process breakthroughs, such as the IRA's decision to decommission some of its weapons in October 2001. In all, Powell's involvement has been fairly balanced. He has consistently advocated the GFA as the way forward for all sides, and seems to have given latitude to Haass and Reiss to support the peace process.

Condoleezza Rice has also participated in high-level meetings in Washington, usually with President Bush or Powell, Haass, or Reiss. In general, however, her visibility on the issue, at least as gauged by the quantity of her public comments on Northern Ireland, has waned since the early days of the Administration, and is fairly tame when compared to the National Security Council's activity on Irish affairs during the Clinton Administration. Still, she and Powell accompanied President Bush on his April 2003 trip to Northern Ireland and on his trip to Ireland this past summer.

Vice President Dick Cheney has filled about the same role as Rice. He has met with Northern Ireland leaders from time to time, usually in the company of other members of the Administration. His comments regarding the situation have been unremarkable, focused primarily on the encouragement of peace and the admonishment of violence.

One person in the Administration who should not be counted on for any knowledge of or support for Irish affairs would be White House advisor Karl Rove. In a September 2004 interview given to the Associated Press, Rove claimed that the future of the battle against Al Qaeda would be similar to the British military's battle against paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. "This is going to be more like the conflict in Northern Ireland where the Brits fought terrorism, and there's no sort of peace accord with Al Qaeda saying 'we surrender,'" he said, conveniently ignoring the GFA. Even Ulster Unionist Party leader David Trimble, hardly a soft touch when it comes to terrorism, expressed confusion over the exact meaning of Rove's remarks, correcting that Al Qaeda is "quite a different terrorist organization" from those in Northern Ireland.

In 2004, the Republican Party is using the Administration's resume on Irish issues to woo Irish Catholic voters, especially in key battleground states. The party's principal communication to date, the party platform, though, failed to address three key domestic issues important to Irish concerns: deportations, the status of undocumented Irish, and a looming new extradition treaty.

As President Clinton left office, it seemed that the issue of deportation was over, or at least severely diminished, in the wake of his suspension of deportation proceedings against a number of individuals. Yet, under the Bush Administration, the policy appears to be alive and kicking. Deportation efforts against Malachy McAllister, Ciaran Ferry, John McNicholl, and other U.S.-based Irish nationals hardly suggest the "review" of such cases pledged by the 2000 Republican platform, but rather a step back to the pre-Clinton-amnesty days of "prosecution." We wonder why any tax dollars or federal manpower would be wasted on deporting Irish nationals of no domestic security threat, given the significant post-9/11 terrorist concerns that endanger us all.

Another domestic issue concerning the Irish is the status of undocumented Irish immigrants. Thousands of Irish immigrants eagerly anticipated that President Bush's immigration reform proposals would include a clear path to permanent legal residence followed, at some point, by full American citizenship. President Bush's proposals were anticipated as being the most significant move toward immigration reform since the Reagan Administration, but they are perceived as not coming anywhere close. His proposals, in reality, are more of a starting point, which contain promises and risks that will be hashed out and ultimately resolved in Congress after the election.

Lastly, voters need to be troubled regarding a new United States-United Kingdom extradition treaty, signed by Attorney General John Ashcroft and British Home Secretary David Blunkett in March 2004. Among our major concerns with the proposed treaty are that it

• (1)?allows for extradition even if no American federal law has been violated,
  
  
• (2)?allows for the provisional arrest and detention of Americans for 60 days upon request by Great Britain,
  
  
• (3)?transfers responsibility for determining whether the extradition request is politically motivated from the federal courts to the executive branch,
  
  
• (4)?applies retroactively to offenses allegedly committed before the treaty's ratification, and
  
  
• (5)?will eliminate the need for any showing of facts by the U.K. to support that the person is guilty of the crime he or she is charged with.

As for President Bush's personal activity on Irish issues, one action has been consistent: attendance at the annual March St. Patrick's Day celebrations involving pleasantries and discussions with most key members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the British and Irish governments. These events have provided a meet-and-greet opportunity for all sides, and have allowed the President to participate in private or shared meetings with key leaders.

Since the first days of the Administration, and particularly since 9/11, President Bush has been in "constant discussion" with Prime Minister Blair, either by phone or through visits in Washington, Northern Ireland, or England. Most of their conversations have been focused on the general war on terrorism, Iraq, and other European and global concerns, and, from time to time, Northern Ireland. By most accounts, the two get along quite well, due in part to their shared religious faith, which makes them politicians of passionately held certainties and self-belief.

President Bush is no stranger to Ireland, either, having made two trips there during his term. The first occurred in April 2003, when, along with Powell and Rice, he traveled to Hillsborough Castle, Northern Ireland, to mee t with Prime Minister Blair, Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, and Northern Ireland leaders regarding the peace process, Iraq, and global security issues. In contrast to the warm Presidential welcomes received by President Clinton in recent years, however, President Bush's trip was characterized by muted enthusiasm amongst the general population, and protest from those critical of his Middle East, Iraq, and global terrorism foreign policy. This protest was not confined to the 600 to 3,000 protestors on the edge of town, either, but rather extended to criticism from several Northern Ireland leaders.

President Bush's second trip occurred in June 2004 at a meeting at Dromoland Castle in Ireland of the U.S.-European Union Summit. A poll released before the visit suggested that 85% of the population would not welcome President Bush to Ireland. Many citizens and leaders expressed alarm over Shannon Airport's use as a host to hundreds of American planes on their way to Iraq, along with the more than 150,000 U.S. troops and their military hardware passing through it. This activity, they believed, put Ireland's traditional neutrality at risk. Concern was also raised that there would be a repeat of February 2003, when more than 100,000 people out of a population of 4 million protested in Dublin against the war in Iraq. To avoid this kind of demonstration and to protect the President, the "largest security operation in the history of the Irish state" was put into place.

Acts of violence against the President were ultimately prevented, but acts of protest and criticism abounded. Approximately 10,000 people demonstrated against the war in Iraq in Dublin on the night of President Bush's arrival; 700 to 2,000 more joined in the next day. Inside the summit, Taoiseach Ahern and Irish President Mary McAleese welcomed the President, but both indicated that Europe and Ireland "abhor[red]" the U.S. Army's treatment of Iraqi prisoners. Ahern also raised the issue of detention and treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. President Bush likewise did not receive a polite welcome from the Irish media, which grilled him on these and other terrorism-related matters. In a joint news conference with Ahern, President Bush maintained that "we view [the Northern Ireland] issue as a very important issue in my Administration and stand ready to help. ... When this conflict is resolved ... it will be an example for others that long-simmering disputes can be put behind them and free societies and peaceful societies can emerge for the interest of the peoples which have been involved in those disputes." In reality, however, the President's trip had little to do with Irish concerns, which were subordinate to the topics of Iraq, AIDS relief, trans-Atlantic trade issues, Sudan, and Iran's nuclear program. The trip had a considerable "we came, we saw, we left" tense feeling to it, in sharp contrast to the gracious, enthusiastic welcomes given in the past to Presidents Kennedy, Reagan, and Clinton.

There were expectations that President Bush's trip to the summit would go some way toward improving U.S.-European relations. Ireland, though, found itself in an awkward position to repair feelings, struggling with its own Euroskeptic tendencies on a number of policies that The Irish Times noted "indicate[d] a move from the enthusiastic core to the skeptical edge of the European integration project."

As President Bush's reception indicates, Ireland has changed. During the President's term, Ireland has been one of the 10 rotating members of the United Nations Security Council and has enjoyed a half-year Presidency of the European Union. Its opinions and its votes matter, as President Bush readily knows and should appreciate, given that Ireland voted in favor of the United Nations Security Council's November 2002 resolution forcing Iraq to reveal and surrender any weapons of mass destruction in its possession, and that it approved the access of U.S. military to Shannon Airport. Ireland's more level relationship with the U.K., improved "Celtic Tiger" economy, and growing economic ties with the U.S. are trending it toward a stage where it will have to carefully choose between isolationism and engagement, between neutrality and militarism.

President Bush's trips to Ireland highlight a great concern we have about his relationship with Europe in general, and Ireland specifically. He does not seem to be able to successfully engage with Irish politicians or the general population in a way that gathers considerable favor, or to show sensitivity toward Ireland's U.S-vs.-Europe dilemma and its changing diplomatic role. Although President Bush and Taoiseach Ahern enjoy good rapport by most accounts, at times the President's attitude and policies have hampered this relationship, most notably over prosecution of the Iraq war, in which Ireland sided with those countries wanting only a U.N.-sponsored intervention.

Irish citizens' protests, Irish media disfavor, and the comments of Ahern, McAleese, and some Northern Ireland politicians -- some reflective of opinion in Ireland, some not -- bring up two crucial questions to this publication and those with Irish concerns: Does it matter how Ireland interacts with the Bush Administration, and does that interaction impact our country's ability to be a neutral broker in the ongoing peace process?

As discussed, there is significant opposition to the President within Ireland's population and political circles, and in the U.K. A recent Irish Times poll revealed that Irish voters strongly favor Sen. Kerry over President Bush by 55% to 18%. And a survey by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes likewise showed that Europeans overwhelmingly oppose the President's reelection. Although Ireland was not among those countries surveyed, the U.K. did record opposition. When the vast majority of greater Europe is opposed to a President, and when Ireland of all countries proves to be inhospitable ground, something is dangerously amiss. This is opposition that should be, if not heeded, at least sincerely listened to: by President Bush as well as the American electorate. After all, if Ireland and its people have nothing to teach us about terrorism management and multinational efforts toward conflict resolution, who does? If we do not listen to them, why should they listen to us?

The ramifications of President Bush's current disfavor in Ireland and Europe bring us to the second question: Does this disfavor impact his personal ability to be perceived as a neutral broker on Northern Ireland issues? Our opinion is that it does.

The journey to the GFA was indeed a roadmap to conflict resolution around the world, driven by diplomacy rather than bullets, international cooperation rather than unilateralism, patience rather than recklessness, and humility rather than hubris. In that vein, the U.S. has been able and ready to contribute timely, professional, nuanced, and effective assistance. President Bush, too, has taken some interest in this issue, certainly not a deep-abiding personal interest that would withstand close comparison to President Clinton's, but an interest nonetheless as reflected through his envoys.

A Northern Ireland foreign policy does exist in the Bush White House: that fact alone is one of the compliments that should go to the Administration. Likewise, appreciation should go to the appointments of envoys Haass and Reiss, both of whom have shown the remarkable passion, interest, and evenhandedness in Irish affairs that will be the benchmark of a potential Kerry Administration should he opt for the State Department course for the conduct of Irish diplomacy.

On the negative side of President Bush's ledger, the status of the deportees, the undocumented Irish, and the ominous new extradition treaty gives us pause from both a legal and a human rights standpoint. Also, the inordinate time taken to find a replacement for Ambassador Egan, and the relegation of the Ambassador's desk to the back row in Irish affairs, are d isappointing developments at best, troublesome at worst, and portend an ineffective post during the next Bush Administration. Indeed, the Administration's uninspired handling of the Ambassadorship seemed disturbingly in accord with later reports that the Administration was "tired" and "bored" with the Northern Ireland parties' failure to fully implement the GFA. If it is indeed in our "national interest" to have peace in Northern Ireland, then persistent and proactive effort is the order of the day. And, if the peace process is truly, as President Bush avers, "a very important issue in my Administration" and "a model for conflict resolution" throughout the world, then it is nonsensical to be "bored" with such a global exemplar.

Amidst the good and bad, however, what troubles us most is President Bush's actions in other arenas on the world stage and how that impacts Irish policy. The Administration has exhibited a "black and white" insular view of the world that has frequently substituted bellicosity for subtlety, especially against smaller nations not deemed high on the pecking order. President Bush's perceived unilateral activity around the world, primarily in Iraq but also at Guantanamo Bay, domestically via the U.S. Patriot Act, and in other instances and locations, has severely damaged our reputation in Ireland and in many parts of the world, and has tarnished his personal ability to be respected as a neutral broker in the Northern Ireland peace process. One can legitimately argue whether this should be the case, but one cannot credibly argue that it is not the case.

Many observers on this soil and in Ireland have rightly criticized the British government for its civil liberties and human rights abuses in Northern Ireland. Now, however, the mirror has been turned toward us. Many, including Ireland, are looking at the Bush Administration, and to some extent our country, and they do not like what they see. When it comes to Northern Ireland, the President has lost much of the "respect for human rights and international law" high ground that he inherited in 2001, at least in Irish and European eyes. The chances of that being fully repaired during a potential second term seem remote. And, even if he were to answer his critics by becoming more personally involved in the peace process, his diplomatic credentials have been compromised by his perceived aggressive, uncompromising, and at times dismissive actions, as exhibited in Irish relations and extra-Irish human rights transgressions at home and abroad. Any President who brags, as President Bush did during his October 8 debate with Sen. Kerry, that "you don't want to join the International Criminal Court just because it's popular in certain parts of Europe" places himself in an untenable position to personally interact on Irish diplomatic affairs.

In our 2000 Presidential Candidates Scorecard, we considered President Bush INTERESTED in Irish affairs, and in our 2002 scorecard we upgraded him to ACTIVE based on some of the activities discussed above. However, in current light, President Bush's personal activity has been well short of proactive on working to restore Northern Ireland's local governance and dealing with immigration, deportation, and extradition issues at home. Those shortcomings, and his inability in Ireland to personally be regarded as an honest broker with a credible resume of respecting international law and human rights principles, dampen our present appraisal of him.

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Northern Ireland Alert:

A San Francisco-based human rights organization, which, among other activities, publishes Northern Ireland Congressional Scorecards monitoring Congressional activity on Northern Ireland-related peace, economic, education, and human rights issues. Its publications are regularly profiled in the Irish News, Ireland on Sunday, the Sunday Business Post, the Irish Voice, the Irish Echo, g21.Net, and other publications.

Publisher: JAMES J. BROSNAHAN, ESQ.- Brosnahan is senior counsel with Morrison & Foerster LLP. He is a former President of the San Francisco chapter of the Irish American Bar Association. As a trial lawyer, he traveled to Northern Ireland in 1996. In 1999, he returned there as part of a Lawyers Committee for Human Rights investigative mission. In 2000, he visited Belfast to teach trial procedure to Northern Ireland lawyers. He has attended high-level discussions at the White House regarding Northern Ireland affairs.

Editor: DAN VANDEMORTEL- VanDeMortel is a research paralegal with Morrison & Foerster LLP, San?Francisco. He has traveled to Northern Ireland with the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and has volunteered for the Committee on the Administration of Justice (a Belfast-based human rights organization). He regularly writes about Northern Ireland human rights topics and has lived in Northern Ireland.

Assistants: Gurjit Aulkh, Leslie Cassidy, Amy Foster, Steven Frankenstein, Richard Gilbert, Barbara Keaton, Maureen Lechwar, Michael Maher, Danny Ngan, Wes Shaw, Patricia Stich Regan, Christina Studt, Helen Wentz.

Address: Northern Ireland Alert would greatly appreciate any editorial or financial contributions to support its future publications. Please forward all contributions, comments, or suggestions to:

James Brosnahan
Dan VanDeMortel
c/o Morrison & Foerster LLP
425 Market Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
phone: (415) 268-7189 or (415) 268-6028
fax: (415) 268-7522
e-mail: jbrosnahan@mofo.com or dvandemort@mofo.com